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Abstract
A definition is proposed to give precise meaning to the counterfac-
tual statements that often appear in discussions of the implications of
quantum mechanics. Of particular interest are counterfactual state-
ments which involve events occurring at space-like separated points,
which do not have an absolute time ordering. Some consequences of
this definition are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Discussions of the interpretation or the implications of quantum mechanics
often use the language of counterfactuals (see for example refs. [1]–[14]);
however, there does not seem to be agreement on exactly what these coun-
terfactuals are to be taken to mean. In this paper I will propose a precise
definition for counterfactual statements which are used in discussions of
quantum theory.
Consider this simple situation: I have two particles called A and B, each
of spin 1
2
, initially prepared in a state of total spin zero. First I measure
Sx (the x-component of the spin) of A, and find the value +1 (expressed
in units of 1
2
h¯); then I measure the value of Sy of B, and also find the
value +1. I suspect that most of us would consider, in this situation, the
statement “If I had measured Sx, instead of Sy, for B, I would have obtained
the value -1” to be true, and likewise the statement “If I had measured
Sx, instead of Sy, for B, I would have obtained the value +1” to be false.
But what do these statements, about a situation that does not exist, really
mean? By the antecedent “If I had measured Sx, instead of Sy, for B” I am
imagining a situation which is exactly like the actual one up until the time
of the measurement of the spin of B (in particular, a situation in which the
particles did indeed have initial total spin zero, and in which I did indeed
first measure Sx for A and obtained the value +1), and in which the value
of Sx of B is then measured. The correct conclusion “I would have obtained
the value -1” can be understood as simply being the implication of quantum
theory for this imagined situation.
In the next section I will propose a definition of counterfactual which
will formalize this understanding of this simple example, and which will
permit an extension to a class of counterfactuals which I call space-time
counterfactuals. This class will include statements about situations more
complicated than the one discussed above, for example situations in which
several choices are made; most importantly, it will include counterfactual
statements about events at different locations, for which a Lorentz-invariant
notion of temporal precedence does not exist. I believe that most of the
counterfactuals used in discussions of quantum theory fall into this class,
but of course many counterfactuals which are used in other contexts do not.
I am certainly not presenting a new general theory of counterfactuals; the
definition I will present is essentially the application of the theory of counter-
factuals of Lewis [15] to space-time counterfactuals, but with a modification
of that theory to accommodate the lack of a relativistically-invariant time
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ordering.
I will restrict the discussion to counterfactuals which concern local-
ized macroscopic phenomena; I will refer to such phenomena generically
as “events”, and will employ the idealization that an event occupies a single
point of space-time. Of course I will allow statements about combinations of
events; the restriction is that each event has a definite location. In the sim-
ple example given above, the event in the antecedent was the choice of which
measurement to make; the class of counterfactuals I consider also includes
those whose antecedent event is, for example, the result of a measurement
performed on a quantum system. I will certainly want to discuss situations
in which particles at different locations are in a quantum-entangled state,
which therefore cannot be represented by any combination of properties each
of which refers only to a single location. Even in these situations, I choose
to consider only those statements which refer to macroscopic, and hence lo-
calizable, properties. Strictly speaking, the simple example discussed above,
in which I specified the quantum state of the two-particle system, does not
respect this restriction. However, I can consider the specification of the
quantum state as merely an abbreviation for a description of the macro-
scopic procedure by which it was prepared. Saying this does not imply a
commitment to any interpretation (e. g., an instrumentalist interpretation)
of quantum theory; it is merely a restriction on what I choose, for the present
purposes, to talk about.
I will be using, starting in the next section, a language involving the
assessment of the similarity of a “possible world” to the actual world. As a
generalization of the statement in the simple example that “everything is the
same up to the time of the measurement on B”, I will base the assessment
on the region of space-time over which the two compared worlds agree,
without introducing any notion of a “degree” of disagreement at individual
space-time points. Of course such a notion could be important for other
applications of counterfactual statements, but I limit the discussion here
to cases in which it is not. So the “space-time counterfactuals” I consider
are those which involve only localizable (in fact, macroscopic) properties,
and whose truth can be assessed by considering the regions of space-time in
which those properties are, or are not, obeyed.
In the next section I will define counterfactuals in a way which is appro-
priate for this case. In the final section I will present some applications of
this definition, and point out some problems with some alternative defini-
tions.
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2 Definition of counterfactual statements
I want to adapt the analysis of Lewis [15] to space-time counterfactuals.
That analysis uses the semantics of “possible worlds.” We can a take possible
world to be any which is consistent with the laws of physics (in practice, it
is usually the laws of quantum physics with which we will be concerned); no
commitment to the existence of any world other than the one actual world
is required.
Lewis’ analysis requires a judgment as to the comparative similarity
of various possible worlds to the actual world. Call a world in which a
proposition φ is true a “φ-world”. Then, in a sense which will be made
precise below, the counterfactual which is written φ → ψ, and which is
read “If φ were true, then ψ would be true” is taken to mean that ψ is true
in the φ-worlds most similar to the actual world; it is not required that ψ be
true in all possible φ-worlds. In the simple example discussed in the previous
section, φ was “Sx of B was measured” and ψ was “Value -1 was obtained”.
Letting t be the time of the measurement of B, and not yet worrying about
the relativistic absence of an unambiguous time ordering, we said in effect
that φ → ψ was true because ψ was true in all φ-worlds which agreed
with the actual world at all times earlier than t. To express this in Lewis’
language, we would say that all worlds which agree with the actual world
at all times earlier than t are equally similar to the actual world, and are
more similar to it than is any world which differs from the actual world at
any time earlier than t.
To see how to generalize this judgment to the relativistic case, consider
three space-time points called A, B, and C, such that B is unambiguously
later than A, and that C is space-like separated from both A and B. This
situation is depicted, using the coordinates of some particular Lorentz frame,
in figure 1, which also indicates the forward light-cones of these three points.
Consider also three possible worlds: world WA first differs from the actual
world at point A; world WB first differs from the actual world at B; likewise
world WC first differs at C. From the preceding discussion, we would say
that WB is more similar to the actual world than is WA, since it first differs
from the actual world at an (unambiguously) later time. Comparing WA
with WC , there is no way to judge between them; in fact in the frame shown
they each differ from the actual world at the same time. We might therefore
be tempted to judge that WA and WC are equally similar to the actual
world. But wait! Since C and B are space-like separated, there is a frame
in which WC and WB first differ from the actual world at the same time,
4
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Figure 1: Three space time points A, B, and C, and their forward light
cones. B is in the unambiguous future of A, and C is space-like separated
from both A and B.
so we should be just as tempted to judge that WC and WB are equally
similar to the actual world. However, if we judge that WA and WC are
equally similar, and also that WC and WB are equally similar, we would be
forced to conclude that WA and WB are equally similar, in conflict with the
judgment that WB is more similar than is WA.
What to do? We could arbitrarily pick a Lorentz frame, and declare that
the possible world which, in that frame, deviates from the actual world at the
latest time is the most similar; we could then use this judgment of similarity
to define counterfactuals as in the analysis of Lewis. However, this definition
will lead to the situation that the truth of certain counterfactual statements
will depend on which frame we happened to pick (an example of this will be
presented in the next section). It is not inconsistent to say that the truth of
a statement may depend on the choice of a frame (the statement “the earth
is at rest” is true in some frames and not in others), but we should be able
to do better. Suppose we say that a counterfactual statement φ → ψ is
“verified” in a given frame if ψ is true in the φ-world which deviates at the
latest time in that frame, and then say that the statement is true if there
is any frame in which it is verified. This would certainly give us a frame-
independent criterion for truth of a counterfactual, but at the price of, for
example, permitting situations in which two counterfactuals φ → ψ1 and
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φ → ψ2, with ψ1 and ψ2 contradictory, would both be true. We will see an
example of this in the next section.
Without further ado, here is my proposal for a definition of space-time
counterfactual statements. For any space-time point r, let F (r) be the set
consisting of r itself and of all points which are unambiguously at a later
time than r (that is, points on or within the forward light-cone of r). For
any set of points D, let D be the union of F (r) over all D; that is,
D := {r′|r′ ∈ F (r) for some r ∈ D}.
Call D the “future closure” of D, and note that for any D, D = D. Now let
Wa denote the actual world, and Wp denote some other possible world. Let
Dp be the set of space-time points at which Wp differs from Wa, that is, the
set of points at which there is an event which is different in Wp than in Wa.
The definition of a space-time counterfactual which I propose, and which I
will refer to as DSTC, is:
The statement φ → ψ is true when either
1. There are no possible φ-worlds, or
2. For any φ-world Wq in which ψ is not true, there is a φ-world Wp in
which ψ is true, with Dp ⊂ Dq.
In the second condition above, I am taking Dp ⊂ Dq to require that Dp
be a proper subset of Dq. This definition DSTC indicates that I regard Dp
as a measure of the similarity of Wp to Wa; the condition Dp ⊂ Dq could be
read as “Wp is more similar toWa than isWq.” In fact, DSTC closely follows
the definition given by Lewis [15], except that the use of set inclusion here
means that we have a partial (pre-)order on the set of possible worlds (not
every pair of possible worlds can be compared), while Lewis requires that
the set of possible worlds have a total (pre-)order1. We have a partial order
because we want similarity to reflect the earliest time at which a possible
world differs from the actual world, and in a relativistic context temporal
precedence is a partial (rather than a total) order on the set of space-time
points. The existence of a partial order for possible worlds has also been
suggested by Pollock[16], on very different grounds.
1An alternative to DSTC, “φ → ψ when there exists a φ-world Wp in which ψ is true
such that, for every φ-world Wq in which ψ is not true, Dp ⊂ Dq ,” which follows even
more closely the formulation given by Lewis, does not work with a partial order. Also,
it should be understood that, although it is not indicated here explicitly, the truth of a
counterfactual depends on the actual world from which it is issued (as is stated by Lewis).
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There is a (pathological) situation in which DSTC would yield an un-
reasonable answer: suppose that the possible φ-worlds could be arranged in
an infinite sequence, say Wi for i = 1, 2, 3, ... with Di+1 ⊂ Di, and with ψ
true in Wi iff i is even. Then both φ → ψ and φ → (∼ ψ) would be true.
This situation obviously would not arise if there were only a finite number
of possible worlds. Since in essentially all applications the number of worlds
considered is in fact finite (and often is quite small) we would not lose much
generality if we were to restrict ourselves to cases of finite numbers of worlds.
However, an even weaker condition will suffice. For a possible φ-world Wp,
say that Wp is a “primary” φ-world if there is no possible φ-world Wq with
Dq ⊂ Dp. Now say that a proposition φ is “closed” if, for every possible
φ-world Wq, either Wq is itself primary, or else there is a primary φ-world
Wp with Dp ⊂ Dq. Then DSTC should be understood as applying only to
antecedents φ which are closed. This restriction is related to the Limit As-
sumption discussed (but neither needed nor adopted) by Lewis. Essentially
any space-time proposition φ which we might reasonably want to consider
will turn out to be closed, so that DSTC will apply; in the next section we
will see examples of propositions which can be proven to be closed.
The definition DSTC can now be restated as follows: For a closed propo-
sition φ, the statement “φ → ψ” means that either 1) there are no possible
φ-worlds, or 2) ψ is true in every primary φ-world. With this definition,
some but not all of the usual inferences for conditionals are valid. Some
examples are: (φ → ψa) and (φ → ψb) implies φ → (ψa ∧ ψb); φ → ψa
implies φ → (ψa ∨ ψb); but φa → ψ does not imply (φa ∧ φb) → ψ (as
it also does not in Lewis’ theory). Let me record here a proof of the first
example: Assume that φ → ψa and that φ → ψb. This means that both
ψa and ψb are true in every primary φ-world; hence ψa ∧ ψb is true in every
primary φ-world, and hence the statement φ → (ψa ∧ ψb) is true.
Since Dp is the set of points at which Wp differs from Wa, it might
be thought that Dp, rather than Dp, should be taken as the measure of
similarity between Wp and Wa. But even in the simple, non-relativistic
example discussed in the first section, for which (I believe) the interpretation
of the counterfactual was uncontroversial, that is not what happened. I
expect that my reader agreed with me that what the counterfactual meant
in that example was that the conclusion should hold in any situation (i. e.
any world) which is exactly like the actual situation up until the time of
the measurement of B. If we simply translate this understanding into the
language of Lewis, we see that, at least in this example, we must judge as
equally similar any two possible worlds which first differ from the actual
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world at a given time t; we do not even have to inquire whether they differ
from the actual world at times later than t.
But why do we not have to inquire? Let me re-phrase (in a perhaps
slightly whimsical manner) the answer that Lewis gave to this question in
the non-relativistic context [17]. Consider a possible world Wp in which a
certain experiment, performed at space-time point r, goes differently than
in the actual world Wa. Then in Wp the journal article reporting the result
of that experiment is written differently than in Wa, and so perhaps the
experimenter receives tenure in Wp but not in Wa, and so... Or to extend
our whimsy in a slightly different direction, we know that any event will
necessarily produce an infinite number of (very low energy) photons; if an
event at r is different in the two worlds, the distribution of photons will be
different also. Of course, left to themselves, the photons will travel along
the (outside of the) forward light-cone of r; however, because of scattering
(e. g. from microwave-background photons) there will also be effects from
these photons throughout the interior of that light-cone. The bottom line
is that, if Wp differs from Wa at r, and if it obeys all the laws of physics
(including the arrow of time which we are certainly not explaining here) it
will also differ (at least) at all points in F (r).
This argument indicates that, for any possible world Wp, the set Dp will
in fact coincide with the set Dp. Of course, in practice we want to specify
a possible world in as economical a way as is possible, without having to
describe in detail who receives tenure in that world, or in even more detail
the effects of an infinite number of infrared photons. And so we specify a
possible world by saying that it differs from the actual world at a small
number of points, while we expect that it differs (at least) in the future
closure of those points. Lewis [17] argued that, for the non-relativistic case
(i. e. with absolute time ordering), if Wp and Wa differ at time t, then we
expect that they will also differ at times later than t, but not necessarily
at times before t. We now see that the generalization of this conclusion to
the relativistic case is that, if they differ at space-time point r, we expect
them also to differ at all points in F (r) (of course they may differ at points
outside F (r) as well).
The definition of counterfactual I have given does allow the trivial case in
which there is no possible φ-world. However, most applications of counter-
factuals in discussions of quantum theory do assume that, due to quantum
indeterminism, φ is in fact compatible with the past of the actual world.
That is, in the case that φ specifies a difference from the actual world at
a single point r, it will usually be expected that there will be a possible
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φ-world which agrees with the actual world at all points which are unam-
biguously earlier than r. This expectation is in addition to the expectation
mentioned previously that there will not be agreement at points which are
unambiguously later than r.
3 Some applications
Let ∆ be a region of space-time; I say that ∆ is a “φ-region” if ∆ = Dq for
some φ-world Wq. Let Σ be a set of φ-regions; I write Σ = {∆α}, and say
that Σ “supports” φ if for any φ-world Wq there is a ∆α ∈ Σ with ∆α ⊆ Dq.
(A set Σ which supports φ is also said to be a “coinitial” subset of the
(partially) ordered set of φ-regions.[18]) Then if Σ supports φ: If Σ contains
only a single element ∆, then any φ-world Wp with Dp = ∆ is primary; if
Σ contains only a finite number of elements, then φ is necessarily closed;
if Wp is a primary φ-world, then Dp ∈ Σ, hence to evaluate the truth of a
statement φ → ψ we need only to consider φ-worlds Wq with Dq ∈ Σ. All
of the examples considered in this section will have antecedents which are
supported by a set Σ containing only a finite number of elements; therefore
these antecedents are closed, and DSTC does indeed apply.
In many cases in which counterfactual statements are made about quan-
tum systems (including the example in the first section) the counterfactual
antecedent represents a free choice. This is sometimes described by saying
that a person can exercise free will to choose between alternatives, but can
just as well be modeled as being controlled by the flip of a quantum coin: a
device prepares an auxiliary particle with spin aligned along the z direction,
and then measures the x-component of spin; the outcome of the measure-
ment then determines the “choice”. Say that χˆa is a choice actually made
at a space-time point r, and that χˆ is an alternative choice that could have
been made. To say that the choice between χˆa and χˆ was a free choice is to
say both that χˆ would have been possible, and that the choice is not cor-
related with anything which is space-like separated from r. We can express
this meaning by saying that, if χˆ is a free choice, there must exist a possible
χ-world Wp which agrees with the actual world everywhere outside F (r);
thus Dp = F (r).
Let χˆ be a free choice at r, and let χ be the proposition that the choice
χˆ is made; then χ is supported by the set consisting of the single element
F (r). Therefore the primary χ-worlds are those worlds Wp with Dp = F (r).
Now let Ψ denote the statement “χ → ψ” (This Ψ represents the type
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of counterfactual statement considered in ref. [7]). Then Ψ is equivalent to
the statement that ψ is true in each world which agrees with the actual
world everywhere outside F (r). As a special case of this, suppose that ψ
refers only to events located outside F (r) (that is, events which are either
unambiguously before or else are space-like separated from r); then Ψ is
true iff ψ is true in the actual world. This result has been shown to follow
from the definition of counterfactual given in the preceding section. Even
if a ψ which refers only to events located outside F (r) is true in the actual
world, there may well be possible χ-worlds in which ψ is not true; if we
had defined, for example, the statement Ψ to mean that ψ was true in all
possible χ-worlds, we would not have concluded that Ψ was true.
Suppose that we have several independent free choices, say χˆi located
at ri, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The proposition (χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ · · · ∧ χn) is supported
by the set consisting of the single element
⋃n
i=1 F (ri), hence the statement
(χ1∧χ2∧· · ·∧χn) → ψ is equivalent to the statement that ψ is true in every
(χ1 ∧ χ2 ∧ · · · ∧ χn)-world which agrees with the actual world everywhere
outside
⋃n
i=1 F (ri) (that is, at all points which are not at nor in the future
of any of the ri). Also, the proposition (χ1 ∨ χ2 ∨ · · · ∨ χn) is supported
by the set Σ = {F (ri}; if the choices are mutually space-like separated,
then any χi-world Wp with Dp = F (ri) is primary, and so the statement
(χ1∨χ2∨· · ·∨χn) → ψ is equivalent to the statement that, for each i, ψ is
true in any χi-world which agrees with the actual world everywhere outside
F (ri), that is, χi → ψ for each i.
The definition DSTC can also be applied to counterfactual statements
of the type discussed in ref. [12]. Consider two spin-1
2
particles A and B,
and measurements performed at a given location (so that the time-ordering
is unambiguous). Say this is the actual world: at time t = 0 the particles
are prepared in a state of total spin zero; at time t = 1 nothing is done;
at time t = 2 the value of Sx of B is measured, with result -1. It follows,
from the fact that the total spin is zero, that the product of the values of
Sx of B and Sx of A must be -1; nevertheless, the following statement is, on
my analysis, not true: “If Sx of A had been measured at t = 1, the result
+1 would have been obtained.” The reason this is not true is that, among
worlds which already differ from the actual world at t = 1, a world with
result +1 at t = 2 and a world with result -1 at t = 2 count as equally
similar to the actual world (even though the actual result at t = 2 was -1).
However, the following statement is true: “If Sx of A had been measured
at t = 1, and Sx of B measured at t = 2 with result -1, then the result of
Sx for A would have been +1”. (Given the actual world as described above,
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this could also be written “If Sx of A had been measured at t = 1, and the
measurement and result at t = 2 were the same as in the actual world, then
the result of Sx for A would have been +1”.) The reason this is true is that
a world with result +1 for B at t = 2 (and hence -1 for A at t = 1) is not a
possible φ-world, if φ includes the specification that the result for B was -1.
As an example of a counterfactual statement whose antecedent does not
involve choices, consider the case of three particles, each of spin 1
2
, located
at space-time points A, B, and C. The x-component of the spin of each
is measured; denote the possible results by a = ±1, b = ±1, and c = ±1.
However, the particles are in an entangled state (for example, the GHZ state
[19]) for which the product abc surely has the value -1. Say that in the actual
world, a = −1, b = +1, c = +1, and consider a statement Ψ1, defined by
Ψ1 := (a = +1) → (c = +1).
The proposition (a = +1) is supported by the set
Σ := {F (A) ∪ F (B), F (A) ∪ F (C)}.
Denote by W1 any (a = +1)-world with D1 = F (A) ∪ F (B); W1 has a =
+1, b = −1, c = +1. Denote by W2 any (a = +1)-world with D2 =
F (A) ∪ F (C); W2 has a = +1, b = +1, c = −1. If A, B, and C are
mutually space-like separated, as shown in figure 2, then both W1 and W2
are primary, and since c 6= +1 in W2, statement Ψ1 is false. On the other
hand, if B is in the unambiguous future of A, as shown back in figure 1,
then since in this case D1 ⊂ D2, only W1 is primary, and then Ψ1 is true.
We could also analyze this same GHZ example using the frame-dependent
definition of counterfactual mentioned in the previous section. For that, we
pick a Lorentz frame, and then say that the possible (a = +1)-world which
deviates from the actual world at the later time is more similar; then say
that the statement Ψ1 defined above is true if c = +1 in the more-similar
world. Take the case in which the three events are mutually space-like sep-
arated, as shown in figure 2. If we pick a frame in which the times of the
events satisfy tC < tA < tB (call that frame α), then world W1 first deviates
at time tA, and world W2 first deviates at time tC ; thus W1 is more similar
to the actual world than is W2, and the statement Ψ1 is true. On the other
hand, suppose we pick a frame in which tB < tA < tC (frame β); then W1
first deviates at time tB, while W2 first deviates at time tA, and so Ψ1 is
false. Thus in this example the truth of Ψ1 depends on which frame we pick.
Finally, we can use this same GHZ example to see what would happen if we
11
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Figure 2: Three space time points A, B, and C, mutually space-like sepa-
rated.
said that a counterfactual statement is true if we can find any Lorentz frame
in which it can be “verified” by the above analysis. We would then say that
Ψ1 can be verified in frame α, and hence it is true. Also, since c = −1 in
W2, and since in frame β world W2 is more similar than is world W1, the
statement (a = +1) → (c = −1) can be verified in frame β, and hence it
also is true. So we wind up saying that statements (a = +1) → (c = +1)
and (a = +1) → (c = −1) are both true.
In summary, this paper has proposed a definition for space-time coun-
terfactuals. Applications are not limited to those in which the antecedent
represents free choices, but the implications of this definition are most sim-
ply stated for those cases. Some of these implications are: if χˆ represents
a free choice, the counterfactual χ → ψ is true whenever ψ is true in all
possible χ-worlds which agree with the actual world everywhere outside the
unambiguous future of the choice; (χ1 ∧ χ2) → ψ means that ψ is true in
all possible (χ1 ∧ χ2)-worlds which agree with the actual world everywhere
outside the unambiguous future of either choice; and when the two choices
are space-like separated, (χ1 ∨ χ2) → ψ means that both χ1 → ψ and
χ2 → ψ are true.
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